

LIVY'S ALEXANDER DIGRESSION (9.17–19): COUNTERFACTUALS AND APOLOGETICS*

By RUTH MORELLO

I. INTRODUCTION

Orthodox historians have tended to dislike attempts to think counterfactually about the past, on the grounds that 'virtual history' offers little more than entertainment and degenerates too easily into banal trivialities.¹ In addition, it provokes fears about the offending historian's commitment to the truth and the consequent effect on his readers' historical memories; a recent essay in the *New Statesman*, deploring the increasing presence of counterfactual history in the syllabus for national exams in British schools, condemned it as an agent of 'collective amnesia'.² E. P. Thompson was more trenchant: 'unhistorical shit'.³ Yet popular and professional interest in counterfactual history continues to grow, spawning a recent radio series and a number of books on the 'what if?' theme.⁴ It seems, then, an opportune time to reconsider the famous passage of counterfactual history in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, the Alexander digression at 9.17–19, a passage which, it so happens, one popular website lists as the first example of the genre.⁵ This paper offers, after a brief survey of previous scholarship (Section II), an account of Livy's allusions both to his sources and predecessors and to his own text (Section III), followed by an integrated reading (Section IV) which will argue more fully that the passage embodies central Livian ideas about the utility of historical writing, that it is thematically tightly woven into its place in Book 9, and, finally, that it offers a powerful critique of one-man rule which has important consequences for our understanding of the historian's view of Augustus.

It is no surprise that this set piece has come under fire for triviality. Livy himself seems to give the criticism some colour when he introduces his excursus in apparently apologetic fashion as a *jeu d'esprit* alien to his main project:

Nihil minus quaesitum a principio huius operis videri potest quam ut plus iusto ab rerum ordine declinarem varietatibusque distinguendo opere et legentibus velut deverticula amoena et requiem animo meo quaererem; tamen tanti regis ac ducis mentio, quibus saepe tacitus cogitationibus volutavi animum, eas evocat in medium. (9.17.1–2)

Nothing can seem to have been sought less from the beginning of this work than that I should deviate unduly from the order of events and, by punctuating the work with varieties of material, seek both as it were agreeable diversions for readers and rest for my own mind; nevertheless, the mention of so great a king and leader calls out into the public sphere those reflections in which I have often revolved my mind in silence.

The topic of this 'agreeable diversion' is the outcome of an invasion that never happened: 'ut quaerere libeat quinam eventus Romanis rebus, si cum Alexandro foret bellatum, futurus fuerit' ('so that I am disposed to seek out what the result would have been for the Roman state if it had come to war with Alexander').

* This paper was first delivered before colleagues at the University of Manchester in autumn 2000. Subsequently, I have profited enormously from the comments and suggestions not only of this journal's anonymous readers, but also of Tim Cornell, Alison Sharrock, John Moles, Tony Woodman, and especially Stephen Oakley, who scrutinized and improved almost every page and generously made sections of his forthcoming commentary on Livy Book 9 available to me in typescript.

¹ N. Ferguson, *Virtual History* (1997), 1–20, surveys the range of responses to counterfactual history.

² Z. Sardar, *New Statesman*, 1 May 2000, 25–7.

³ E. P. Thompson, 'The poverty of theory', in idem, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (1978), 300 (see Ferguson, op. cit. (n. 1), 5).

⁴ Most recently: R. Cowley (ed.), *What If? Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been*, (2000); S. Tally, *Almost America: From the Colonists to Clinton: A 'What If?' History of the US* (2000). For the increasing interest in the counterfactual among classicists, see K. Brodersen (ed.), *Virtuelle Antike: Wendepunkte der alten Geschichte* (2000).

⁵ <http://www.uchronia.net>.

Rome would, of course, have won ('invictum Romanum imperium', 9.17.4), and Livy proposes a tripartite agenda for proving it ('plurimum in bello pollere videntur militum copia et virtus, ingenia imperatorum, fortuna per omnia humana maxime in res bellicas potens', 'the most potent factors in war appear to be the numbers and manly virtue of the soldiers, the abilities of the commanders, and fortune, which is powerful in all human affairs, but especially so in war', 9.17.3). In practice, though, the issue of fortune is subsumed into two unequal sections (9.17–18 and 9.19), as Livy offers first a 'synkrisis' of the Macedonian and Roman leaders ('ut ordiar ab ducibus comparandis', 'to begin in order, from comparison of commanders', 9.17.5) in which he focuses on the leaders' experience, character, and reputation (9.17.5–18.19), and then a comparison of the two armies in numbers, equipment, and *virtus* (9.19).

The rhetorical strategy of both sections is to outnumber and outmanoeuvre Alexander in virtually every sentence. Although the synkrisis springs partly from a traditional pairing of Alexander and Papirius (9.16.19), the first section also features several other outstanding contemporaries (some already hailed in Livy's text as 'unus homo' or 'unicus ultor') who might have opposed the invader (9.17.8–9). The second section argues that Roman troops, too, would have outnumbered and outclassed the degenerate Macedonian veterans (9.19.iff.). Most importantly, the Romans, both soldiers and commanders, are fortified by the 'military discipline' which has been developed and refined since the very earliest days of the city.⁶ This will continue to guarantee the safety of the *imperium*, provided peace and concord endure:

Mille acies graviore quam Macedonum atque Alexandri avertit avertetque, modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae. (9.19.17)

[The Roman Soldier] has averted and will avert a thousand more weighty armies than those of the Macedonians and Alexander, provided that the love of this peace under which we live, and the concern for citizen harmony, be perpetual.

II. CRITICAL APPROACHES⁷

The critical response to the Alexander digression reflects modern suspicion of counterfactual history in general. Anderson's famous view that it was merely a juvenile showpiece which Livy could not resist patching into the text was long unchallenged among Anglophone scholars,⁸ partly because they agreed with him that it was 'a

⁶ 9.17.10–11. On the army's technical expertise, cf. 9.17.15 (commanders' skills); 9.19.6–9 (army equipment and deployment).

⁷ Standard bibliography: W. B. Anderson, 'Contributions to the study of the ninth book of Livy', *TAPA* 39 (1908), 89–103; idem, *Livy Book 9* (1928), esp. 255–8; A. Momigliano, 'Livio, Plutarco e Giustino su virtù e fortuna dei Romani', *Athenaeum* 12 (1934), 45–56; P. Treves, *Il mito di Alessandro e la Roma d'Augusto* (1953); L. Alfonsi, 'Sul passo liviano relativo ad Alessandro Magno', *Hermes* 90 (1962), 505–6; T. J. Luce, 'The dating of Livy's first decade', *TAPA* 96 (1965), 209–40; E. Burck, *Vom Menschenbild in der römischen Literatur* (1966), 327ff.; H. R. Breitenbach, 'Der Alexanderkurs bei Livius', *Museum Helveticum* 26 (1969), 146–52; A. Toynbee, 'If Alexander the Great had lived on', in idem, *Some Problems of Greek History* (1969), 441–86; O. Weippert, *Alexander-Imitatio und römischen Politik in Republikanischer Zeit*, diss. Augsburg (1972), esp. 1–16 and 224–49; J.-Cl. Richard, 'Alexandre et Pompée: à propos de Tite-Live 9.16.19–19.17', *Mélanges P. Boyancé* (1974), 653–99; G. Wirth, 'Alexander und Rom', in *Alexandre le Grand, image et réalité*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 22 (1975), 181–210; L. Braccisi, 'Livio e la tematica di Alessandro in età Augustea',

CISA 4 (1976), 179–99; V. Viparelli Santangelo, 'Ironia e ideologia nell'excursus del 9 libro delle Storie di Livio', *BStudLat* 8 (1978), 43–55; F. W. Walbank, 'Livy, Macedonia and Alexander', in *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of Charles F. Edson* (1981), 335–56; F. Santoro L'Hoir, 'Heroic epithets and recurrent themes in *Ab urbe condita*', *TAPA* 120 (1990), 221–41; J. Sager, 'Alexander the Great in Roman literature from Pompey to Vespasian', in J. Carlsen, B. Due, O. Steen Due and B. Poulsen (eds), *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*, Analecta Romani Instituti Danici 20 (1993), 75–84; N. Biffi, 'L'excursus liviano su Alessandro Magno', *BStudLat* 25 (1995), 462–76; W. Suerbaum, 'Am Scheideweg zur Zukunft: Alternative Geschichtsverläufe bei römischen Historikern', *Gymnasium* 104 (1997), 36–54; G. Forsythe, *Livy and Early Rome* (1999), 114–18.

⁸ cf. Conway/Walters, *CQ* 12 (1918), 100: a 'boyish yet thoughtful *deliberatio*'. E. T. Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* (1967), 228, regarded the post-Caudine narrative as being full of 'rhetorical irrelevancies', including the 'long-winded essay' on Alexander. In 1971 J. Briscoe (in T. Dorey (ed.), *Livy* (1971), 13) still accepted Anderson's view: 'the section intrudes somewhat unhappily into the narrative'.

somewhat futile discussion of a somewhat futile question',⁹ and partly because of its apparent bombastic chauvinism. Continental scholars, however, have tended to be more generous, detecting in it a richly complex allusivity. Treves, in particular, refocused the debate in 1953 in opposition to Anderson's view.¹⁰

The principal problem remained the digression's apparently uneasy relationship with its immediate narrative context and with the *Ab Urbe Condita* as a whole, a problem exacerbated by the sheer number of motivating 'triggers' the text claims in its own justification (the mention of Alexander,¹¹ the follies of Romanophobic Greeks,¹² the *elogium* of Papirius¹³). Treves denied any thematic or linguistic links between the digression and the preceding Caudine narrative, and highlighted the difficulties of its position in Book 9, particularly the inaccurate synchronism between Alexander's death and the third consulship of Papirius (thought to be the traditional pretext for synkrisis between them), and drew attention to the disingenuousness of the first of Livy's 'triggers', the mention of Alexander. As he pointed out, readers have encountered Alexander already at 8.3.7, where Livy refers to him in an elegiac, synoptically biographical manner which Treves thought might have offered a more natural springboard for a fictional encounter between Rome and the Macedonian. As a solution, he posited publication of Books 1–10 in separate books, and suggested that by the time Livy had thought of this intriguing digression, Book 8 (its natural habitat) was already in the hands of readers so, *faute de mieux*, he slotted it into Book 9.

Others, notably Burck and Lipovsky, offered a structural interpretation, explaining the length and position of the digression as an attempt on Livy's part to isolate the Caudine disgrace in the first part of Book 9 from the rest of the book,¹⁴ and to distract the reader from the memory of shame.¹⁵ Burck's reading, on which Lipovsky drew, was the more nuanced: for him the passage was 'eine Art Rombild', but even he saw it as essentially post-Caudine apologetic.¹⁶ Viparelli Santangelo reached a similar conclusion,¹⁷ although she mounted a useful challenge to Treves' uncoupling of digression and context by choosing the *elogium* of Papirius (9.16) as the primary 'trigger' for the digression.

Others have preferred to turn the discussion away from the second pentad altogether and either to look towards a different literary tradition (Breitenbach, for example, demonstrates a parallel with Isocratean praise of monarchy) or to seek a contemporary agenda in the digression. Treves had already read the passage in the light of contemporary polemic about Rome's Parthian failures; this line has been followed most recently by Marincola, who selects the attack on Romanophobic Greeks at 9.18.6–7 as the main motivating 'trigger'.¹⁸ Von Haehling, however, sees the picture of the drunken orientalizing Alexander as the 'portrait' of Antony, while Richard reads the digression, in the light of Augustus' famous remark about Livy *Pompeianus* (Tac., *Ann.* 4.34.3), as covert praise of Pompey. Finally, Santoro L'Hoir, who analyses the *unus vir* motif which will be the main focus of Sections IV and V of this paper, also seeks contemporary resonance; for her the digression foreshadows the polarities of Actium (an East–West conflict which pits Roman virtue against 'Oriental' vice), and the entry of Augustus (the *unus vir*) into Roman history. She finds the key to understanding 'the

⁹ Anderson, *op. cit.* (n. 7, 1908), 94 (repeated in his commentary, *op. cit.* (n. 7, 1928), 256).

¹⁰ Treves, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 15.

¹¹ 9.17.2.

¹² 9.18.6. These are usually identified as Timagenes and Metrodorus of Scepsis.

¹³ 9.16.19.

¹⁴ J. Lipovsky, *A Historiographical Study of Livy Books VI–X* (1981), 141; Burck, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 326. For analogies between 9.17–19 and the Gallic digression (5.33.2–35.3), which seems to separate the Gallic Sack from the rest of Book 5, see Viparelli Santangelo, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 44; S. P. Oakley, *A Commentary on Livy Books VI–X* (1997), vol. i, 113.

¹⁵ Lipovsky, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 151. Cf. Salmon, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 226, 229.

¹⁶ Burck, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 325.

¹⁷ 'È infatti solo l'*excursus* che permette di considerare conclusa la vicenda di Caudio e di giudicarla nella sua esatta prospettiva storica', Viparelli Santangelo, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 45.

¹⁸ Treves, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 20; J. Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (1997), 224. Cf. E. S. Gruen, 'Augustus and the ideology of war and peace', in R. Winkes (ed.), *The Age of Augustus* (1985), 70.

broader significance of the episode' in the final warning at 9.19.15–16 ('civilia bella sileant').¹⁹

Although many of these interpretations are stimulating, none is fully satisfactory, and all tend to rely too heavily on one or two sentences of the digression, eschewing close reading of the whole. Thus, for example, 9.18.6 (on the pro-Parthian Greeks) inspires both those who read the passage as anti-Greek polemic and those who detect allusions to Augustus' notorious negotiations with Parthia.²⁰ Favouring one 'trigger' over another immediately conditions and limits interpretation.

Moreover, while scholars are right to look for broader significance, the arguments have too often been circular. In trying to understand what is going on in the digression and asking the question 'why does it seem not to belong in its immediate context of Book 9 and of the *AUC*?', our answer has been 'because it doesn't belong: it's meant to distract from the unpleasantness in the woodshed of Roman history; it's allegory (and so really all about Octavian, Antony, or even Pompey); it's literary revenge for Carrhae; it's a youthful declamatory exercise inserted here in self-indulgence'. We have too rarely made a serious attempt to understand the digression as historiographically legitimate, as participating in debates inherited from Livy's predecessors, and as a vital contribution to the architecture of the second pentad. It is the aim of this paper's next two sections to show that this has been a fundamental mistake. The digression is densely allusive, both to Livy's own work and to that of his predecessors. It is demonstrably linked in theme and language to Sallustian debates about Roman virtue and the dangers of *magnitudo* into which Livy entered at the very start of his work; it is creatively reminiscent of Catonian historiography; it fits neatly into what we can suppose to have been a strong tradition of counterfactual speculation both in public oratory and in historiography; furthermore, it can be interpreted as fully consistent with Livy's overall historiographical project of providing *exempla* of timeless significance. Finally, it concerns itself with a central historical/historiographical question: the place of *unus homo* both in *res publica* and in *res gestae*.

III. 9.16–19 AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PROJECT

The Counterfactual Tradition

The counterfactual was built into Roman historical thinking from early on, and is specifically associated with Alexander in the earliest oratorical instance of 'virtual history'. Appius Claudius Caecus, in his famous speech of 280 B.C. against a treaty with Pyrrhus, is said to have referred to an already existing habit among Romans of positing victory in a hypothetical encounter with Alexander:²¹

Ποῦ γὰρ ὑμῶν ὁ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους θρυλούμενος αἰεὶ λόγος, ὡς, εἰ παρῆν ἐκεῖνος εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὁ μέγας Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ συνηνέχθη νέοις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς πατράσιν ἡμῶν ἀκμάζουσιν, οὐκ ἂν ὑμνεῖτο νῦν ἀνίκητος, ἀλλ' ἢ φυγῶν ἂν ἢ που πεσὼν ἐνταῦθα τὴν Ῥώμην ἐνδοξοτέραν ἀπέλιπε; ταῦτα μέντοι κενὴν ἀλαζονείαν καὶ κόμπον ἀποδείκνυτε, Χάμονας καὶ Μολοσσούς, τὴν αἰεὶ Μακεδόνων

¹⁹ R. von Haehling, *Zeitbezüge des T. Livius in der ersten Dekade seines Geschichtswerkes: nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus*, *Historia Einzelschr.* 61 (1989), 57; cf. Luce, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 228 for possible allusion to the disasters of Crassus in the desert and Antony in the mountains; Richard, *op. cit.* (n. 7); Santoro L'Hoir, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 240: 'the entire gratuitous episode seems to make sense in relation to the rest of the narrative only if Livy intended it to foreshadow the pivotal battle of his own century'.

²⁰ The latter, at least, connect digression to context by pointing also to 9.15.7 (on the recovery of stand-

ards surrendered at Caudium, 'receptis omnibus signis') in support of their interpretation, reading it as an allusion to the recovery of the standards lost at Carrhae (see Treves, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 20).

²¹ *ORF* 1.1–11; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (1972), 26–9. The translation is that of Kennedy. For the speech, cf. Cic., *Cato Maior* 16, *Brut.* 55, 61; Livy, *Per.* 13; Quint., *Inst.Or.* 2.16.7; App., *Samn.* 10.4–6. For a full account of the problems of dating and authenticating its subject matter, see Weippert, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 10–17.

λείαν, δεδιότες, καὶ τρέμοντες Πύρρον, ὅς τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου δορυφόρων ἓνα γοῦν αἰεὶ περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων διατετέλεκε.

Where is your usual boldness of speech in the face of all men to the effect that if the great Alexander himself had come to Italy and attacked us in our youth and our fathers in their prime he would not now be celebrated as undefeated, but either fleeing or dying somewhere here he would have left Rome more glorious? You surely show these words to be false pretence and empty boasting in your fear of Chaonians and Molossians though always the prey of Macedonians, while you tremble at Pyrrhus who used to pass his time following around and flattering one of Alexander's bodyguards. (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 19)

Of our sources for this speech, only Plutarch refers to a custom of counterfactual boasting, and Kennedy suggests that he introduced this embellishment to Claudius' speech, dredging up an Alexander topos from the silt of rhetorical commonplaces.²² Clearly, however, this imaginary encounter with Alexander could plausibly be presented as a familiar scenario, frequently discussed ('your usual boldness of speech'). Livy, much earlier than Plutarch, is already avowedly working within existing 'Alexander' traditions both of counterfactual speculation and of synkrisis. His sources appear to have designated Papirius the most likely candidate for command against Alexander ('quin eum parem destinant', 9.16.19). At 9.18.6 the frequentative 'dictitare solent' suggests the repetitiveness of Parthia-loving Greek intellectuals on Alexander's chances against Rome,²³ and at 9.18.9 Livy refers again to opinions from his sources ('extollunt . . . intellegunt'). Livy is situating himself within a debate and working with material no longer available to us.²⁴

The Preface

The inherited debate is, however, transformed, as Livy both makes it more personal and keys it in to his own historiographical project. Among the many other 'triggers' for the digression was, he says, his own longstanding attachment to the topic ('quibus saepe tacitus volutavi animum', 9.17.2) and first-person verbs abound in the whole passage. His reader, too, is pulled in by the offer of 'deverticula amoena' and by a slippage in the second-person verbs at 9.18.11, where Livy's imagined adversary must be the reader himself as well as the Rome-hating Greeks: 'why do you not compare (*tu . . . confers*) men with a man, leaders with a leader, fortune with fortune?'²⁵ Finally, the digression, having begun in an imaginary past and the first person singular, ends in the 'real' present and the plural ('modo sit perpetuus huius qua *vivimus* pacis amor', 9.19.17); the interests of reader and author, which were initially founded on shared enjoyment of rest and pleasure, now overlap on the basis of historical utility.

²² Alexander was a favourite subject for rhetorical display. Surviving examples, largely of the type which conditioned Anderson's response to the digression, include the *suasoriae* of the Elder Seneca urging Alexander to travel across Ocean (*Suas.* 1) or to enter Babylon (*Suas.* 4), and the debates (represented in Plutarch's *De fortuna Romanorum* and *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*) about the relative importance of fortune and virtue for the success of Rome and of Alexander.

²³ Livy's interest in, and familiarity with, Parthian matters is suggested by *Per.* 100, which tells us that the book contained a departure from the narrative of Roman affairs, namely an account of the war in the 60s B.C. between Phraates of Parthia and Tigranes the Armenian, although the chronological gap between the composition of Book 9 and Book 100 limits the usefulness of this evidence in relation to the digression.

²⁴ There is other evidence, too, for Livy's interest in counterfactuals: Seneca (*NQ.* 5.18.4) reports that the historian was uncertain whether it would be better if Caesar had never been born, although he does not indicate whether this debate appeared in one of Livy's philosophical/historical dialogues or in a digression from later books of the *AUC*. Suerbaum (op. cit. (n. 7), 42) notes counterfactual speculation also in Book 2.1.3–6, as to the effect Brutus' actions would have had if they had taken place earlier in Rome's history.

²⁵ von Haehling, op. cit. (n. 19), 25 n. 17. 9.18.12 strengthens the likelihood that it is the reader in his historical activity of surveying the monuments of history (see *Praef.* 9–10) who is the addressee of 9.18.11.

This personal engagement with the material, and the close relationship between reader and author, take us back to the more explicitly programmatic Preface, which the digression's opening immediately recalls ('a principio huius operis', 9.17.1 ~ 'a primordio urbis', *Praef.* 1). The formally apologetic mode of 9.17.1 picks up the apparently hesitant tone of the Preface (*Praef.* 1–2), as Livy echoes his own initial preference of pleasure over utility.²⁶ That pleasure should lie in turning away from a task (as Livy turns himself ('declinarem', 9.17.1) and his reader ('deverticula', 9.17.1) away from the task in hand) is also in line with the Preface:

ego contra hoc quoque laboris praemium petam, ut me a conspectu malorum quae nostra tot per annos vidit aetas . . . *avertam*, omnis expers curae quae scribentis animum, etsi non *flectere* a vero, sollicitum tamen efficere posset. (*Praef.* 5)²⁷

I, by contrast, will seek this additional reward of hard work, . . . that I may avert myself from the sight of evils which our age has seen over so many years, free of all concern which, if it could not bend a writer's mind from the truth, could nevertheless make it uneasy.

However, at 9.17.1 reader and historian share enjoyment from the beginning (contrast 'minus praebitura voluptatis', *Praef.* 4, with 'deverticula amoena', 9.17.1), and 'requiem' and pleasurable 'deverticula' alike seem to lie partly in abandoning strict annalistic treatment ('ab ordine declinarem', 9.17.1) in favour of a meditative review of the period and a different ordering of material ('ut ordiar ab ducibus comparandis', 9.17.5).

The digression's survey of the great men of the period, the stress upon the military *ars* which has been perfected, systematized and handed down ('in artis perpetuis praeceptis ordinatae modum venerat', 9.17.10), and the emphasis on the *series* of leaders and rulers (9.17.11) all encourage the reader in the task Livy assigned in *Praef.* 9:

ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, *per quos viros quibusque artibus* domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit.

But *I* would like each reader for himself to direct his mind attentively to these questions: what was the kind of life, the kind of customs, by what men and arts was imperial power (both at home and abroad) acquired and expanded?

Both 'ordiar' and 'ordinatae' emphasize that though the digression has abandoned the 'ordo rerum' considered to be a desideratum of proper historiographical narrative, it has compensating 'ordines' of its own, which help to justify its seriousness. Nevertheless, Livy changes both the perspective from which history is seen and the speed at which reader and writer travel through it. In the Preface, although his fundamental concern is always really with the present, inasmuch as study of the virtuous past is necessary to repair present disasters, he insists on the importance of the slow and thorough approach to reading and writing history ('perscripserim', *Praef.* 1), and criticizes those readers who want to hurry past early material to get to recent events ('festinantibus ad haec nova', *Praef.* 4). In the digression, however, he permits us to 'run through' whole periods quickly ('paginas in annalibus magistratumque fastis *percurrere* licet consulum dictatorumque', 9.18.12), before forcing us to think about 'our own day'.

²⁶ *Praef.* 3, 'iuvabit tamen'; 9.17.2, 'tamen . . . libeat'. On pleasure as naturally associated with digressions, see A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (1988), 106 n. 15.

²⁷ For *deverticulum*, see *TLL* V.1.854.23–65. On *deversoria* and *deverticula*, cf. E. Gowers, 'Horace, Satires 1.5: an inconsequential journey', *PCPS* 39 (1993), 50–1.

Sallust

Moreover, the digression continues Livy's debate with Sallust which has already been well-documented in studies of the Preface.²⁸ Two passages from the *Bellum Catilinae* are of particular importance here: the 'archaeology' (especially *Cat.* 7) and the synkritic digression (*Cat.* 53–4).

Allusions to the 'archaeology' frame Livy's digression. He concurs with his predecessor's conventional *pensées* on the pre-eminence of *ingenium* in war (*Cat.* 2.2), the dominance of fortune (*Cat.* 8.1), and the need for concord (*Cat.* 9.1).²⁹ More importantly, the period Livy describes as most fruitful in virtues (9.16.19) clearly belongs within that of *Cat.* 7.1–7 (although it predates that of *Hist.* 1.10), and Livy's picture of Rome at her laboriously virtuous best is subtly reminiscent of that of Sallust.³⁰ Moreover, the Sallustian ideal of the soldier-general outstanding in both *corpus* and *ingenium* is clearly embodied in Livy's picture of Papirius Cursor (9.16.12; 9.17.13; cf., e.g., Sall., *Cat.* 1.7; 60.4).

The synkritic digression (*Cat.* 53–4) partly fuels Livy's introduction to his own synkrisis. Standard topoi first: like Livy, Sallust presents his 'digression' as the fruit of considerable private thought³¹ which he makes a conscious decision not to conceal from his reader,³² and which he connects to his narrative in an apparently casual fashion.³³ Thereafter, in drawing a familiar contrast at 9.16.19 between virtuous heyday and contemporary degeneration, he employs a metaphor of fertile productivity to indicate the profusion of virtues generated in the late fourth/early third centuries ('illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum *feracior* fuit, nemo unus erat vir', 9.17.1). In Sallust's period, by contrast, fertile productivity has reached an all-time low ('sicuti *effeta* parente, multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit', *Cat.* 53.5) before the state manages to produce only two men of *virtus*, namely Cato and Caesar, the subjects of the synkrisis.³⁴

Cato and Ennius

Like Sallust's archaeology,³⁵ Livy's digression recalls and adapts Cato's famously idiosyncratic attitudes to individual heroism and fame which prompted him to avoid

²⁸ R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 1–5* (2nd edn, 1970), 23ff. Cf. A. Leeman, *Helikon* 1 (1961), 30f.; M. Paschalis, *Livy's Praefatio and Sallust*, diss. Ohio State University, (1982); J. Korpanty, 'Sallust, Livius und *ambitio*', *Philologus* 127 (1983), 61–71; J. L. Moles, 'Livy's Preface', *PCPS* 39 (1993), 141–68.

²⁹ At 9.17.3 the use of *pollere* (see W. D. Lebek, *Verba Prisca* (1970), 300) helps to mark these conventionalities as Sallustian (contrast Caesar's *potest* in *BG* 6.30.2).

³⁰ 'igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat', 'So for such men toil was not unaccustomed, no terrain was harsh or arduous, an armed enemy held no fears: manly virtue had subdued everything', *Cat.* 7.5; cf. 'nunquam ab equite hoste, nunquam a pedite, nunquam aperta acie, nunquam aequis, utique nunquam nostris locis laboravimus', 'never have we had difficulties from enemy cavalry, never from infantry, never in open battle, never on even terrain, certainly never on our own ground', 9.19.15–16.

³¹ 'mihi multa legenti, multa audienti', *Cat.* 53.2; 'mihi multa agitanti', *Cat.* 53.4. Cf. 'quibus saepe . . . cogitationibus volutavi animum', Livy 9.17.2. Cf. Vell. 1.16.1.

³² '*silentio* praeterire non fuit consilium', *Cat.* 53.6; 'quibus saepe *tacitus* cogitationibus volutavi animum', Livy 9.17.2.

³³ 'quos quoniam res obtulerat', *Cat.* 53.6 (cf. 'res ipsa hortari videtur', *Cat.* 5.9); 'tanti regis ac ducis mentio . . . eas evocat in medium', Livy 9.17.2.

³⁴ *Cat.* 53.5 contains a textual crux, but the image seems clear. Livy's model of an idealized past is, as so often, less monolithic than that of the Sallustian monographs. On the one hand, Livy flatters Rome by ascribing fully-developed *disciplina* to the regal period while Sallust dates the beginning of really intensive training only to the competitive post-regal era. On the other, Livy's assessment of Roman success is more nuanced in allowing for setbacks due to unfavourable conditions (9.19.15–16) and political obstacles to consular achievement (9.18.13–16).

³⁵ See, recently, D. Levene, 'Sallust's *Catiline* and Cato the Censor', *CQ* 50 (2000), 170–91.

naming individual generals in his *Origines*.³⁶ Livy is, of course, by no means suppressing the personal fame of Papirius and his contemporaries; at 9.17, his opening gambits depend on 'pageants of Roman heroes', and the force of a name is thematically central to the digression. Nevertheless, as the digression develops, he increasingly expounds the corporate qualities of the 'great names' and the collective advantages of the Roman people rather than the individual laurels of their leaders, before shifting finally and decisively towards the achievements and potential of a representative and anonymous *miles*.

Livy's use of the *unus homo* motif contains further, and more obviously sustained, allusions to Catonian historiography. Cato's famous contrast between constitutional design by accretion through generations (Rome) and by single lawgiver (Greece) is allusively reworked in Livy's synkrisis between individual conqueror (Greece) and multiple commanders/*populus* (Rome). At 9.18.9 Livy also converts to the service of military 'history' the polarities (one vs. many, one lifetime vs. many generations) of Cato's constitutional history:

nostra autem res publica non *unius* esset ingenio sed *multorum*, nec *una hominis vita* sed *aliquot* constituta *saeculis et aetatibus*. (Cicero, *De Re Publica* 2.2.1)³⁷

Our republic, however, was not established by one man's ability, but by that of many, nor in one human lifespan but over several generations and eras.

These strategies in Livy create a certain tension both with the epic traditions of Roman heroism and with the *topoi* associated with *elogia*, particularly that of a commander's status as *unus homo*, the one outstanding individual of his day. Ennius' famous eulogy of Fabius Maximus ('*unus qui nobis cunctando restituit rem*', 'the one who by delaying restored the state for us')³⁸ appears to have established the formula in epic, and will undoubtedly have been in readers' minds as they read 9.16.19 ('*nemo unus erat vir quo magis innixa res Romana staret*', 'there was no one man on whom the Roman state leaned more and more on whom it stood'); the even stronger echo of *Ann.* 156 ('*moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque*', 'on ancient customs stands the Roman state, and on men') suggests that Livy may even be exploiting a tension already inherent in the two Ennian lines.³⁹ However, the digression's movement away from *elogium* of one man to a synchronic 'pageant of Roman heroes' and then back to '*elogium*' of a collective singular *miles* needs emphasis, partly because it demands refinement of Viparelli Santangelo's argument that the *whole* digression derives from traditional *elogia* of Papirius.

The Architecture of Books 7–9

The digression encourages the reader, then, to think back to historiographical issues raised in the Preface, and to consider the interaction between Livy's text and those of two of his most influential predecessors. The texts intersect particularly in a

³⁶ Pliny, *N.H.* 8.11. See D. Kienast, *Cato der Zensor* (1954), 109–10; A. J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94–131)* (1977), 30f. On the parallels between Catonian practice and the strategies of Livy's text, see C. S. Kraus, *Livy. Ab Urbe Condita Book VI* (1994), 17 n. 69.

³⁷ If, as is now usually assumed, Sall., *Hist.* fr. 8M ('*nam a principio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum*') is a reference to the scope of Cato's *Origines*, we may be looking at a more subtle allusion to Cato's work: Livy's digression, after all, refers briefly to events and people within the same timespan, i.e. *a principio urbis* (cf. 9.17.1; 9.17.11) *ad bellum Persi Macedonicum* (cf. 9.19.14). For comment and bibliography on the Sallustian fragment, see P. McGushin, *Sallust. The Histories, Books i–ii* (1992), 67–9.

³⁸ *Restituit rem* means, literally, 'made the state stand again'. This line is quoted by Livy at 30.26.9. Cf. Ogilvie's comments on Livy *Praef.* 9. On Ennius and the Alexander digression, see Alfonsi, op. cit. (n. 7), 506; J. Pinsent, 'Livy 6.3.1 (*caput rei Romanae*): some Ennian echoes in Livy', *LCM* 2 (1977), 15; Santoro L'Hoir, op. cit. (n. 7), 231; S. P. Oakley, *A Commentary on Livy Books VI–X* (1998), vol. ii, 445. For the *unus homo* motif in *elogia*, see Cic., *Cato Maior* 61 on A. Atilius Calatinus ('*hunc unum plurimae consentiunt gentes populi primum fuisse virum*') and *CIL* I.28 on Scipio ('*hunc oino plourume cosentient R[omani] / duonoro optimo fuisse viro*').

³⁹ I owe this suggestion to Stephen Oakley.

debate about the place of *unus homo* in the state. At the same time, 9.17–19 is keyed to important passages in earlier books of the *AUC*, particularly the authorial intervention at 7.29.1–2, the army digression of 8.8.3–14, and the ‘framing’ episodes of the beginning and end of Book 8, in which first Manlius and then Papirius demand observance of army discipline.

7.29.1–2

maiora iam hinc bella et viribus hostium et longinquitate vel regionum vel temporum quibus bellatum est dicentur. Namque eo anno adversus Samnites, gentem opibus armisque validam, mota arma; Samnitium bellum ancipiti Marte gestum Pyrrhus hostis, Pyrrhum Poeni secuti. Quanta rerum moles! quotiens in extrema periculorum ventum, ut in hanc magnitudinem quae vix sustinetur erigi imperium posset!

From now on I shall speak of wars greater both because of the enemies’ fighting-power and the extent of place and time in which the fighting was conducted. For in this year, military hostilities began against the Samnites, a people strong in military and economic resources; after the Samnite war, which was fought without final resolution, came Pyrrhus as our enemy, and after Pyrrhus the Carthaginians. What a mass of history! How often we reached extremes of danger, so that the empire might be built up to this size which is scarcely being sustained!

This passage is an important precursor to the Alexander digression in the breadth of its vision; in surveying a very large tranche of Livy’s text/subject its scope extends from Book 7 up to Book 16, at least, and possibly up to Book 30. It presents Rome’s increasing contact with major foreign enemies as a coherent period of historical development, which culminates in Sallustian fashion with the Carthaginian Wars, and its final sentence, like that of the digression, takes the reader back to the Preface/the present, as the outcome of all these wars (‘hanc magnitudinem’, 7.29.2) is said to have direct implications for ‘the state we are in today’ (‘quae vix sustinetur’, 7.29.2).

The Alexander digression expands and extends 7.29. Not only does it catalogue virtually all the commanders who fought the Samnites, but it also alludes implicitly or explicitly to all the major wars in the series advertised at 7.29: Caudium and Cannae (the big disasters at either end of the sequence) are juxtaposed at 9.19.9, the wars with Pyrrhus are economically suggested by the anonymous allusion to his ‘wise adviser’, Cineas, at 9.17.14, and the Carthaginian Wars are anticipated at 9.19.6 (cf. 9.19.12–13).⁴⁰ At 9.19.15, Livy extends his reader’s vision to include the real encounters between Rome and Macedon to be described in the fourth and fifth decades; finally, he halts in the present, as he had at 7.29. In interweaving all these allusions, he creates a composite *exemplum* which reaches to his own day and onwards but is firmly rooted in the period of the second pentad.

Book 8

The positioning of the digression in Book 9, rather than at the first naming of Alexander, allows it not only to flow naturally from the anecdotal sketch of Papirius and the traditional pairing with Alexander, as Viparelli Santangelo rightly saw, but also to build upon Papirian material from Book 8. Alexander’s first appearance, at 8.3.7, and even his second, at 8.24.1, both precede the reader’s first extended encounter with

⁴⁰ A further engagement at 9.17.15 with ‘Pyrrhic’ material is pointed out by Weissenborn-Müller (1890), ad loc.: Livy’s eulogy of his commanders’ technical military skills (9.17.15) contrasts with 35.14.8–9, where Hannibal (naming the three greatest

generals as Alexander, Pyrrhus, and himself) credits Pyrrhus with first development of several of these skills. Clearly, then, the Alexander digression gives Rome the opportunity to ‘defeat’ all three of the world’s greatest generals.

Papirius Cursor at 8.30ff., where Papirius attempts to execute Fabius for disobedience. That narrative, which feeds into the reader's understanding of the Alexander digression, demonstrates Papirius' capacity for extreme anger — a trait notoriously also in Alexander's emotional make-up —, and also illustrates the strife between commanders to which Livy alludes at 9.18.15. Most importantly, it sketches Papirius' own fears for military discipline (upon which, the Alexander digression goes on to make clear, the state depends) and for the future of good government.⁴¹

Papirius' speech against Fabius is concerned partly with ensuring the perpetuity of Rome's authority ('*maiestas imperii perpetuane esset*', 8.34.5; '*horum criminum vos reos in omnia saecula offerite*', 8.34.11). The historian, too, closes his digression with the pre-requisites for Rome's survival beyond the close of his own work ('*modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor*', 9.19.17). The emphasis on perpetuity at 9.19.17 picks up the praise of *disciplina*'s durability from 9.17.11 ('*artis perpetuis praeceptis ordinatae*') and also, arguably, the interrelated concerns of Manlius⁴² and of Papirius himself at the beginning and end of Book 8. All this would have been lost had the Alexander digression been positioned near the beginning of Book 8.

Livy's assessment of the Roman army, too, looks back to this book. At 8.8.3–18 he offers a digression on the flexibility of Roman troop deployment, a digression which, perhaps coincidentally, begins with the information that Roman soldiers had grown out of a Macedonian style of equipping and deploying soldiers.⁴³ The point of this digression, as of the Alexander digression (see Section IV below), is to show the Romans disturbing a match between one Roman soldier and a single, designated enemy: in Book 8 the Romans are facing an army of Roman-trained Latins deployed in precisely the same pattern as the Romans themselves,⁴⁴ and they only succeed by providing extra men at a key position in the line,⁴⁵ and by creatively rearranging standard troop patterns under Manlius' command (8.10.1–7) after Decius' *devotio* (8.9.4–12). The importance of this episode to the digression is further suggested by the presence of both commanders in the two 'catalogues' at 9.17.8 and 9.17.12–13; in particular, Manlius' traditional role as a special exponent of *prisca disciplina* makes him an ideal *exemplum* in the digression.⁴⁶

Finally, Book 8 is not, as Treves thought, a natural place for Livy's hypothetical invasion, as it already contains an 'Alexander digression' in which Livy narrates the invasion and death of the Alexander who *did* come to Italy, the Epirote uncle of Alexander the Great. Both references to Alexander the Great in Book 8 are linked to the Epirote Alexander's story: at 8.3.6–7 the age of the younger Alexander's achievements is described as synchronic with his uncle's attack on Italy ('it is agreed that in this year Alexander King of Epirus landed his fleet in Italy . . . this is also the age of the great Alexander's achievements'), while at 8.24.1 the foundation of Alexandria opens the digression on the Epirote's death in Lucania. Moreover, Livy encourages us to read the Epirote's story as a forerunner of his nephew's entrance into Roman 'history'. Their 'narratives' are parallel both in the role of fortune and in striking counterfactual elements. At 8.3.6–7 Livy tells us that the Epirote 'would undoubtedly' have attacked Rome if his battles in Lucania had gone well (so this is the first counterfactual Alexander), and that fortune wiped out his nephew (the second counterfactual Alexander). At 8.24, however, it is the Epirote whom fortune removes and sends home to his female relatives (including Olympias, Alexander's mother). The Epirote's importance as the advance guard of counterfactual Alexanders is highlighted in the

⁴¹ 8.34. On *disciplina* and the sources of Roman military strength as a central theme in Book 8 as a whole, see Lipovsky, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 102, 130.

⁴² 8.7.19, '*cum aut morte tua sancienda sint consulum imperia aut impunitate in perpetuum abroganda, nec te quidem . . . recusare censeam, quin disciplinam militarem culpa tua prolapsam restituas*'.

⁴³ Having abandoned the *clupeus* for the *scutum* and the phalanx for the maniples and subsequently for even more flexible deployment of well-spaced groups, 8.8.3. Cf. 9.19.7–8.

⁴⁴ 8.8.15.

⁴⁵ 8.8.18.

⁴⁶ The death of Decius (9.17.13), as Livy describes it in 8.9.9–14, demonstrates the capacity of the Romans to succeed despite the loss of a commander. The account of the battle at Vesperis surely illustrates at least one of the points made at 9.18.13–19: Manlius' masterly management of the battle after Decius' death can do duty as an instance of a commander compensating for the *temeritas* of a colleague. For this reading of 8.9.9–14, see R. Morello, 'Livy on *devotio* and *disciplina*', *Revue de Philologie* (forthcoming).

digression at 9.19.10–11, where Livy quotes him in support of the contrast between a manly Italian enemy and effeminate Asians:

Ne ille saepe, etiamsi prima prospere evenissent, Persas et Indos et imbellem Asiam quaesisset et cum feminis sibi bellum fuisse dixisset, *quod Epiri regem Alexandrum* mortifero vulnere ictum *dixisse ferunt*, sortem bellorum in Asia gestorum ab hoc ipso iuvene cum sua conferentem. (9.19.10–11)⁴⁷

Indeed, even if opening engagements had come out advantageously, he would often have longed for Persians and Indians and unwarlike Asia, and would have said that his warfare had been with women, as they tell us Alexander King of Epirus said when struck with his fatal wound, comparing the lot of wars fought in Asia by this very same young man with his own lot.

As Kraus neatly puts it, the Book 9 digression allows Alexander the Great to ‘invade’ the text,⁴⁸ but he is not the first Alexander to do so, and Livy assures us that his experience would repeat that of his predecessor. Locating the Book 9 digression in Book 8, then, as Treves wished to do, would have loaded the earlier book with two Alexander digressions, the first of which already has the beginnings of its own counterfactual narrative, and deprived the reader of cumulative supporting material provided by the army digression of 8.8.3–18, the Papirian narrative of 8.3off., and the Epirote’s invasion.

Book 9: The Caudine Forks

There are, finally, positive gains to be made from interpreting the digression within its immediate context in Book 9, and although thematic and verbal links between digression and narrative are not, at first sight, especially numerous, they are stronger than Treves (or even Viparelli Santangelo) would have had us believe.

The digression is formally tied to its context not only by the mention of Alexander and the inherited synkrisis with Papirius, but also in the last manifestation of a dominant metaphor of the Caudine narrative, the metaphor of the road. The vision of progress through history as a journey along a road is found already in the Preface, where Livy combines it with the well-known image of a collapsing building (*donec . . . ad haec tempora perventum est*, *Praef.* 9). The act of reading as forward movement more generally is to be found in his assurance that one can ‘run through’ (*percurrere*) the records of historical events and commanders. Moreover, readers and protagonists have been more or less together on the road at Caudium and the road of history since the topographical sketch at 9.2 which described the choice of roads open to the Roman legions on their way to Luceria, and began a narrative which was full of roads and journeys.⁴⁹ In this context, when Livy writes of deviating (*declinarem*) from a strict annalistic treatment and of offering his readers pleasant diversions (*deverticula amoena*), the road metaphor which traditionally introduces digressions regains its full colour.

In addition, the digression maintains the reader’s interest in a number of important themes and motifs from the Caudine narrative:

- i. The value of counterfactual calculations. Counterfactual or speculative thinking has already been represented in the narrative in the speeches of Postumius at 9.9.5–6, of Herennius (the ‘Warner’ figure, whom Suerbaum sees as the personified representative

⁴⁷ cf. 9.17.17, ‘vestigia domesticae cladis’.

⁴⁸ C. S. Kraus, ‘“No second Troy”: *topoi* and refoundation in Livy, Book V’, *TAPA* 124 (1994), 268. For digressions which offer readers symbolic invasions of the territory described, see C. S. Kraus and A. J. Woodman, *Latin Historians* (1997), 40–1.

⁴⁹ See R. Morello, ‘Place and road: neglected aspects of Livy 9.1–19’ (forthcoming). Cf. Kraus, *op. cit.* (n. 47), 286; M. Jaeger, ‘Guiding metaphor and

narrative point of view in Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*’, in C. S. Kraus (ed.), *The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts* (1999), 183–93. On the road metaphor in Greek writers, see O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im Frühgriechischen Denken*, *Hermes Einzelschr.* 4 (1937). For the road image used to introduce or describe digressions, see, e.g., Quint. 4.3.14.

of alternative history⁵⁰) at 9.3.6–13, and, to some degree, of Lentulus at 9.4.8–16. It has also informed the deployment of the road metaphor in the narrative, as the reader is constantly aware that there would have been no disaster, *if only* the Romans had chosen, instead of the short road through the Caudine Forks, the longer one they finally do take in the Revenge Expedition at 9.13.6. There the counterfactual actually becomes real, as 'locis maritimis' recalls the road not taken ('praeter oram superi maris') of 9.2.6, and all succeeding encounters with the Caudine Samnites feature open battle, rather than entrapment. Thus, the counterfactual mode of the digression fits its context well, as possible outcomes and counterfactual speculations have been part of the Caudine narrative from its very beginning.

That narrative, although formally preserving an annalistic shape, is situated on faultlines in the historiographical tradition. Book 8 ended with Livy's famous complaint about the difficulties created by over-enthusiastic family archivists:

Vitiatam memoriam funebribus laudibus reor falsisque imaginum titulis, dum familiae ad se quaeque famam rerum gestarum honorumque fallente mendacio trahunt; inde certe et singulorum gesta et publica monumenta rerum confusa. (8.40.4)

I think memory has been impaired by funeral eulogies and false inscriptions under portraits, as individual families appropriate reputable achievements and honours with deceptive mendacity; this is certainly a source of confusion in the achievements of individuals and in public memorials.

At the end of the Caudine peripeteia, Livy gives further information about the chaos in the tradition which blurs his own picture of Papirius as the new Camillus (9.15.9–10, see above). The subject-matter of the episode between these two passages is subtly disruptive of the normal patterns of history. The story is about a passage, not a war ('sequitur hunc annum nobilis . . . pax', 9.1.1), which is ignominious but oxymoronically *nobilis* because of Roman disaster. The results of the Roman abandonment of the peace agreement are no less paradoxical (9.12.3–4). That a narrative like this should be rounded off with an assessment of a war which never happened and an enemy who never came seems entirely in keeping.

ii. The natural disposition (*indoles*) of the Romans. In particular, the Roman inability to live with defeat and their resilience after disaster (highlighted at 9.19.9) feature in two important speeches in the Caudine narrative, both given by senior figures attempting to correct their juniors' undervaluation of the Roman temperament.⁵¹

iii. The importance of the soldier within a harmoniously functioning citizen body and the guarantees of success that attend a restoration of harmony after discord:⁵² Lentulus' crucial speech in the Caudine Forks, in particular, insists on the primacy of soldiers (9.4.11–12), but his arguments are flawed by his scorn for the 'unwarlike and unarmed multitude' of the city (9.4.13) and his misuse of allusion to Camillus (9.14.4). His argument fosters divisive attitudes among the citizen soldiers and is shown to be unfair not only by the fact that both grief and joy are universally shared after the Caudine negotiations (9.7.6–9; 9.10.2–6) but also by the enthusiastic voluntary enrolment of new soldiers from among the despised city multitude at 9.10.6 and the reassertion of Roman dominance after harmony has been restored. The digression, too, shows that the soldier must be privileged over individual commanders, but that his proper functioning depends upon the health and harmony of the civilian state (9.19.17).

iv. The advantages of age over youth. This conventional polarity, although common in the *AUC*, is particularly highly developed in the Caudine narrative, as we are offered not only familiar disagreements between the generations on the same side (9.3.5–10; 9.6.13–7.5), in which the old are consistently proved right, but also a narrative strategy which 'trumps' the Samnite *senex*, Herennius, by asserting the greater importance of the people and *senatus* of his enemy (9.9.12).⁵³ In the digression, the deployment of the

⁵⁰ Suerbaum, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 45.

⁵¹ 9.3.12 (Herennius); 9.6.10 (Calavius). Cf. Viparelli Santangelo, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 46 n. 11.

⁵² 9.7.15; 10.4–5; 12.3–4.

⁵³ See Morello, *op. cit.* (n. 49).

age/youth polarity across enemy lines is taken still further, as Livy portrays the Roman people as the pre-eminent *senes* of the world (see Section IV).

v. Even the topography of Italy is revisited, as Alexander is imagined as the viewer of a countryside rather like that of the ambush scene at 9.2.7 ('saltus Apuliae ac montes Lucanos cernenti', 'as he beheld Apulian passes and Lucanian mountains', 9.17.17).

vi. Finally, the Caudine narrative already simultaneously exalts Papirius to *unus homo* status and questions that elevation (see Section IV).

IV. RE-READING THE ALEXANDER DIGRESSION

The historian seems to ground his speculations about the hypothetical war between Rome and Alexander in an anodyne and traditional synkritic programme. 9.16, the 'prologue' to the digression, sketches the character of Papirius, the greatest leader of his generation and commander of the Caudine Revenge Expedition. Around him a mass of anecdotal material had gathered in the tradition, some of which matched him with Alexander. Both men were remembered as Great Individuals, each lauded as the *unus homo* upon whom the safety of his nation depended.⁵⁴ They shared (although Livy does not make this explicit, and the reader must draw upon outside material) other important characteristics. Both, for example, were heavy drinkers, both fast runners, both famous for extravagant rages.⁵⁵ When Livy says, then, that he proposes to begin by comparing commanders ('ut ordiar ab ducibus comparandis', 9.17.5), the reader is expecting the traditional synkrisis between Papirius and Alexander.

However, Livy quickly moves away from his advertised comparison between two men, offering instead a match between the Macedonian and eleven Roman contemporaries.⁵⁶ Solitary greatness is at once problematized and the historian begins to play upon standard *topoi* ('one vs. many', 'human lifetime vs. national era', and other numbers games) in order to demolish the foundations of Alexander's reputation as Livy himself has defined them: that he was unique and that he died young. Alexander's status as heroic individual becomes a handicap rather than a strength as his great name is outclassed by a crowd of evocative names on the other side, most of whom have already appeared in Livy's history:

Recenseam duces Romanos, nec omnes omnium aetatium sed ipsos eos cum quibus consulibus aut dictatoribus Alexandro fuit bellandum, M. Valerium Corvum, C. Marcium Rutulum, C. Sulpicium, T. Manlium Torquatum, Q. Publilium Philonem, L. Papirium Cursorem, Q. Fabium Maximum, duos Decios, L. Volumnium, M'. Curium? (9.17.7-8)

Should I review the Roman leaders, not all, from all ages, but those very men with whom (as consuls or dictators) Alexander would have had to fight, M. Valerius Corvus, C. Marcus Rutulus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo, L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the two Decii, L. Volumnius, M'. Curius?

Papirius' status as *unus homo* is also adjusted, and he comes only sixth in this 'pageant of Roman heroes'.

The recontextualization of Papirius within the whole of his generation has already been suggested in the important introductory sentence at 9.16.19:

Haud dubie illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo unus erat vir *quo magis* innixa res Romana staret.

⁵⁴ 'Nemo unus erat vir quo magis innixa res Romana staret', 9.16.19; 'unum Alexandrum', 9.18.18. See Santoro L'Hoir, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 230-41.

⁵⁵ Drinking: 9.16.13 'capacissimum' (cf. Dio fr. 36, 23) ~ Sen., *Ep.* 83.23. Livy's Papirius, though, can take his food and drink. Athletics: 9.16.13 (where Livy comments on Cursor's name, and uses the word

cursu) ~ Plut., *Alex.* 3.5; *De Alex. fort.* 1.9. Rages: 8.30.10ff. Cf. 8.35.10 'trucem dictatoris iram'; 8.35.12 'ira alienavit animos' ~ Sen., *De ira* 3.17.1-3. On Papirius' *ira*, see Lipovsky, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 119f.

⁵⁶ Not all of them quite contemporary (Breitenbach, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 148).

It can hardly be doubted that in that age, than which none was more fruitful in virtues, there was no one man on whom the Roman state leaned more and more on whom it stood.

There is surely some equivocation here in Livy's reworking of the Ennian *unus homo* motif. There is no doubt about Papirius' talent ('haud dubie', cf. 'vir haud dubie dignus omni bellica laude', 9.16.12), but as the product of a virtuous age he is not alone in his possession of it. Even at his election during the crisis, the narrative excluded doubt as to his talent but still denied him uniqueness.⁵⁷

Is consules creavit Q. Publilium Philonem et L. Papirium Cursorem iterum haud dubio consensu civitatis, quod *nulli* ea tempestate *duces clariores* essent. (9.7.15)

He oversaw the election as consuls of Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius Cursor (consul for the second time), with the unambiguous and universal approval of the citizenry, on the ground that no leaders at that time were more distinguished.

Moreover, although the Revenge Expedition narrative is dominated by Papirius, Livy ends it by highlighting an unexpected ambiguity in the sources as to who actually led the campaign. The historian's difficulty again lies in verifying solitary and pre-eminent achievement, as the doubt in the sources seems to militate against Papirius' pre-eminence in the post-Camillus generation. This doubt is cast into relief by comparison with the certainties of the Gallic Sack, especially the unquestioned dominance of Camillus:

id magis mirabile est ambigi Luciusne Cornelius dictator cum L. Papirio Cursore magistro equitum eas res ad Caudium atque inde Luceriam gesserit *ultorque unicus* Romanae ignominiae haud sciam an iustissimo triumpho ad eam aetatem secundum Furium Camillum triumphaverit an consulum — Papirique praecipuum — id decus sit. (9.15.9–10)⁵⁸

It is more remarkable that there is a dispute as to whether Lucius Cornelius as dictator, with L. Papirius Cursor as his cavalry commander, conducted this campaign at Caudium and subsequently at Luceria, and celebrated a triumph as the sole avenger of Roman humiliation — a triumph which I am inclined to think the best deserved up to that date after Furius Camillus — or whether that distinction belongs to the consuls, particularly to Papirius.

Negotiating the memory of the Gallic Sack and filling Camillus' place has already been a central problem for the Roman protagonists in the Caudine disaster, and the figure of Camillus is flagged at 9.17.11 as the immediate predecessor of the Caudine generation, and the link between them and the earlier military tradition. 'One man' vocabulary was particularly associated with Camillus in Books 5 and 6, as Kraus has shown.⁵⁹ The Caudine narrative has even offered a Camillus *manqué* in Lentulus (the L. Cornelius who is a candidate for 'ultor unicus' status at 9.5.9), who makes the only Roman speech during the ambush scenes (9.4.7–16). There he claims authority on the basis of a speech allegedly made during the Gallic Sack by his father who, he asserts, was the only man to favour ('unum auctorem', 9.4.8) rejection of Brennus' ransom demand. In urging the Caudine legions to accept Samnite terms, he dispels the hope of a new Camillus to protect the city after disaster, and his allusion to Camillus' famous exhortation (5.49.3) to redeem Rome 'ferro non auro' serves to underline both the dearth of unique heroic figures during the ambush itself and the incongruity of his own assumption of that

⁵⁷ Contrast the special foreknowledge given to the reader of Camillus' importance (5.19.2), and the subsequent confirmation of that importance (5.32.7; 6.1.4), or the exclusive focus on Papirius' son at 10.38.1, while his consular colleague's name is suppressed until 10.39.1. Ammianus restores Papirius' solitary status ('the only one (*solus*) considered fit to resist Alexander, if he had set foot on Italy', 30.8.6); cf. Oros. 3.15.10 and Jo. Lyd., *Mag.* 1.38.

⁵⁸ Santoro L'Hoir, op. cit. (n. 7), 238, slips up here: the name in apposition to 'ultor unicus' is not Papirius

but Cornelius. For Livy's unusually copious use of *unicus*, see E. Dutoit, 'Unicus, unice chez Tite-Live', *Latomus* 15 (1956), 481–8. For the significance of Camillus during the Caudine disaster, see especially 9.4.14. On the annalistic uncertainty as to the commander of the Revenge Expedition, see Forsythe, op. cit. (n. 7), 72–3.

⁵⁹ A. J. Pomeroy, *The Appropriate Comment. Death Notices in the Ancient Historians* (1991), 163 n. 43; Kraus, op. cit. (n. 36), 128, 176, 226.

role.⁶⁰ The digression, however, confirms that his view of the state was misguided, by offering the reader a whole generation of worthy successors to Camillus (9.17.11).

Thus, by 9.17.11, 'one man' status is already called into question, and the digression has neatly slotted Papirius into his contemporary context by establishing a multiplicity of contemporary matches for Alexander. This runs in tandem with the attack upon the other source of Alexander's fame: his youth. Livy argues that Alexander's failure to live past his early thirties accounts for his inexperience of misfortune and reversal. That his luck could not have lasted is demonstrated by the cases of Cyrus and Pompey ('*Cyrum . . . quid nisi longa vita, sicut Magnum modo Pompeium, vertenti praebeuit fortunae?*', 'what but long life exposed Cyrus, just like the Great Pompey in recent times, to the turns of fortune?' 9.17.6). Even the contemporary (Roman) Magnus could not cheat fortune forever.

All Roman commanders, however, have not only talent and numbers on their side, but a guarantee of recurrent success in their military training, which was handed down *ab initiis urbis* and has now become 'an art ordered according to perpetual teachings' (9.17.10), spanning generations and constitutional structures alike:

Ita reges gesserant bella, ita deinde exactores regum Iunii Valerique, ita deinceps Fabii, Quinctii, Cornelii, ita Furius Camillus, quem iuvenes ii quibus cum Alexandro dimicandum erat senem viderant. (9.17.11)⁶¹

Thus had the kings conducted wars, thus thereafter those who drove them out, the Junii and Valerii, thus subsequently the Fabii, Quinctii, Cornelii, thus Furius Camillus, whom the young men who would have had to combat Alexander saw in old age.

Disciplina lasts longer than any one man. The many great commanders of Alexander's day had had sight of the aged Camillus, the greatest exponent of Roman military skill before Papirius, and were themselves practitioners of that skill which came down to them as a kind of national heirloom. Livy has already established, then, in the first section of his analysis, Rome's synchronic *and* diachronic advantages; Alexander's hypothetical invasion of Italy comes up against the whole of Roman history.

The following section (9.17.12–17) repeats the same process, naming available Roman defenders before again turning to the Romans' mastery of the military art. The four most evocative names of 9.17.8 (Manlius, Valerius, the Decii, Papirius) are conjured up to match Alexander's military skill ('obviously Manlius Torquatus or Valerius Corvus would have given way (*cessisset videlicet*) had they been matched with him in battle', 9.17.12), before Livy explicitly moves away from named individuals altogether:

victus esset consiliis iuvenis unius, ne singulos nominem, senatus ille, quem qui ex regibus constare dixit unus veram speciem Romani senatus cepit! (9.17.14)

The counsels of one young man would have overcome, to name no individuals, that senate, the Roman senate whose true likeness was captured by just one man who said it consisted of kings!

The contrast between 'unus iuvenis' on the one hand and (naming no names, 'ne *singulos nominem*') the council of elders ('senatus') on the other could hardly be more pointed. Alexander is not only outnumbered but equalled in rank by hundreds of 'kings'; even the solitude of kingship is transcended in the pluralist Roman system.

The Catonian abandonment of individual names (even the name of the one perceptive ambassador who coined the idea of the senate of kings) is now the rule in the digression, and the historical survey of 9.18.12f. will offer no names at all:

⁶⁰ Lentulus' father: 9.4.8. Camillus: 9.4.14. 'Not gold but arms' motif: 9.4.16. The memory of Camillus will again be problematic in the third decade, where unique, Camillan, status is once more treated as a matter for irony: see Dutoit, *op. cit.* (n. 58), 486 and Kraus, *op. cit.* (n. 36), 128.

⁶¹ *Exactores regum* must be pointed in this context: Roman *disciplina* was first practised not only by kings like Alexander, but also by those who drove them out.

Paginas in annalibus magistratuumque fastis percurrere licet *consulum dictatorumque* quorum nec virtutis nec fortunae ullo die populum Romanum paenituit. (9.18.12)

In the annals and the calendars of the magistrates it is possible to run through pages of consuls and dictators whose manly virtue and fortune never on any day gave the Roman people cause for grief.

This movement away from named individuals contributes to a curious tension between style and content. Livy's language in the digression is markedly epicizing, and in at least two instances reminiscent of Ennius, but the digression works against the epicizing tendency to glorify 'lonely pre-eminence and ultimate omnipotence'.⁶² The importance of names or epithets is constantly re-evaluated; even Alexander's distinguishing epithet, Magnus, is outmanoeuvred in Livy's text, since, as Richard⁶³ points out, Livy leans heavily on Pompey's cognomen, Magnus (9.17.6), a tactic which is hardly innocent in a passage meditating on the sources and extent of an enemy's *magnitudo* (9.18.8).

These size and numbers games go further, however. Both Cyrus ('quem *maxime* Graeci laudibus celebrant', 9.17.6) and Pompeius *Magnus* do duty (one Greek, one Roman; one king, one general) for the numbers of great examples ('*magna exempla*', 9.17.6) which Livy rhetorically omits. The potential vanquishers of Alexander in Papirius' generation (including Q. Fabius *Maximus*)⁶⁴ are followed by '*ingentes viri*' in the succeeding one. By 9.18.12, names, however great, have become almost irrelevant ('*quot Romanos duces nominem?*'), and by 9.18.19 Livy is in a position (at least rhetorically) to make his extraordinary claim that several Romans could equal Alexander even in greatness ('*Romani multi fuissent Alexandro vel gloria vel rerum magnitudine pares*', 'there would have been many Romans to match Alexander in glory and in greatness of deeds').

The true synkrisis here, of course, is between Alexander and Rome, and Livy denies Alexander the fair comparison he urges at 9.18.12 ('why do you not compare men with a man, leaders with a leader, fortune with fortune?') and redirects the debate to Rome's advantage. It is now *Rome's* name that is at stake here:

Id vero periculum erat, quod levissimi ex Graecis, qui Parthorum quoque contra *nomen Romanum* gloriae favent, dicitare solent, ne maiestatem *nominis Alexandri*, quem ne fama quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse, sustinere non potuit populus Romanus. (9.18.6)

I suppose *that* was the danger, as the most lightweight of Greeks who favour the glory of the Parthians too against the Roman name are accustomed to repeat, that the Roman people would not have been able to withstand the majesty of Alexander's name, who in my opinion was not known to them even by repute.

No other names are needed; the collective 'Roman name' transcends all other Roman names, and outweighs that of Alexander, as Rome's history outweighs his in *magnitudo*:

Quantalibet *magnitudo hominis* concipiatur animo; *unius* tamen ea *magnitudo hominis* erit collecta paulo plus decem annorum felicitate; quam qui eo extollunt quod populus Romanus etsi nullo bello multis tamen proeliis victus sit, Alexandro nullius pugnae non secunda fortuna fuerit, non intellegunt se *hominis* res gestas, et eius *iuvenis*, cum *populi* iam *octingentesimum bellantis annum* rebus conferre. Miremur si, cum ex hac parte *saecula* plura numerentur quam ex illa *anni*, plus *in tam longo spatio* quam *in aetate tredecim annorum* fortuna variaverit? (9.18.8–10)

Let the greatness of the man be conceived to be as big as you like; nevertheless that greatness will be that of one man, amassed in the good fortune of little more than ten years; those who extol it on the grounds that the Roman people have been conquered in many battles, if in no war, while the outcome of no battle was unfavourable to Alexander, fail to understand that they are comparing the achievements of a man — and a young man, at that — with the achievements of a people already fighting in their eight hundredth year. Should we be

⁶² P. Hardie, *The Epic Successors of Virgil* (1993), 3.

⁶³ Richard, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 663.

⁶⁴ On Fabian number games in other contexts, see Hardie, *op. cit.* (n. 62), 5.

surprised if, since more generations may be counted on one side than years on the other, fortune varied more in so long a period than in an active life of thirteen years?

Rome's *magnitudo* here, as elsewhere in the *AUC*, is not simply a matter of grand achievements but rather of age and long development.

The expansion of the initial synkrisis is now complete. The Macedonian conqueror who was matched first with Papirius (9.16.19), then with eleven of Papirius' contemporaries (9.17.8), then with the whole Senate (9.17.14), is now finally confronted with the Roman *populus* (9.18.9), his short life swept aside before the antiquity and endurance of the Roman state.⁶⁵ Again, we have the contrasts between one and many ('*hominis res gestas . . . cum populi . . . rebus conferre*') and between young and old. This experienced old opponent (Rome) can outclass even the very greatest, since it has ably survived the blows of fortune ('*Romanum, quem Caudium, quem Cannae non fregerunt, quae fregisset acies?*', 'what army could have broken the Roman, whom Caudium, whom Cannae did not break?', 9.19.9) as even Pompey or Cyrus, great though they were, could not.⁶⁶

As Livy moves on to consider '*militum copia et virtus*' in 9.19, Alexander is again 'conquered' by greater numbers, flexibility, and stamina. Rome, Livy says, could frequently muster several legions even without Italian reinforcement, and with added allied troops could produce an impressive force against the Macedonians and their useless (at best) oriental auxiliaries.⁶⁷

Further, Roman equipment was, Livy says, more effectively designed, and the deployment patterns of the legions more flexible than those of the Macedonians; in this context, too, the 'one vs. many' motif is important:

sed illa phalanx *immobilis et unius generis*, Romana acies distinctior, *ex pluribus partibus constans*, facilis partienti, quacumque opus esset, facilis iungenti. (9.19.8)⁶⁸

But that phalanx was immobile and of one kind, while the Roman line was more variegated, consisting of several sections, easy to separate wherever necessary, and easy to join up.

Finally, their stamina was such as Alexander never encountered in the East, as his own uncle, the Epirote Alexander, was said to have realized.⁶⁹

Again, the central argument in this second section of the digression is based on numbers, in this case the disparity in years not only between Alexander and his Roman opponents, but also between one war and an era of unremitting hostilities:

Equidem cum per annos quattuor et viginti primo Punico bello classibus certatum cum Poenis recorder, vix aetatem Alexandri suffecturam fuisse reor ad unum bellum. (9.19.12)

Indeed, when I remember that in the first Punic War our navies struggled with the Carthaginians over twenty-four years, I think that the lifespan of Alexander would have barely sufficed for one war.

This reinforces the contrasts in age and staying power that began to unfold in the first section of the digression at 9.17.5 and were most fully developed at 9.18.9 ('*non intellegunt . . . conferre*'). Rome's synchronic advantages are substantial: a large pool of talented leaders from which to draw commanders, several hundred 'kings' to provide *consilia*, vastly greater numbers of troops. They are matched, though, by her diachronic

⁶⁵ cf. 9.19.12.

⁶⁶ Note already the collective singular *Romanum*.

⁶⁷ 9.19.5. Again, Alexander's achievements are minimized: those conquered by the Romans were to be respected, while little profit or satisfaction was to be found in breaking and harnessing hordes of orientals.

⁶⁸ The chiasmic arrangement ('*immobilis . . . constans*') helps to ensure that *constans* is felt by the reader not only in its syntactically natural meaning as

the participle from *consto*, but also in an adjectival sense: the Macedonians are unwieldy or immobile, while the Romans' very flexibility makes them stand firm.

⁶⁹ Rather unfairly, Alexander's inexperience of Romans is countered by the Romans' experience of Macedonians in wars long after Alexander's death; the counterfactual can bend the normal rules of historical time and use 'future *exempla*'.

advantages: the tradition of military discipline which is embodied in the soldiery, and the apparently infinite lifespan of the city's power.⁷⁰

The emphasis on the *disciplina militaris*, a system which applies to the whole army, not just to its commanders, and which Livy takes back to the very earliest days of the city helps to elide the distinction between the first and second sections of the digression. Moreover, in marking the soldierliness of at least two of Rome's best commanders ('Manlius Torquatus aut Valerius Corvus, insignes ante milites quam duces'),⁷¹ Livy already anticipates his radical foregrounding of the *miles* at 9.19.17.

That *miles*, both as fighter and citizen, has been and will continue to be the agent of Rome's survival:

nunquam ab equite hoste, nunquam a pedite, nunquam aperta acie, nunquam aequis, utique nunquam nostris locis laboravimus: †equitem†, sagittas, saltus impeditos, avia commeatibus loca gravis armis miles timere potest. Mille acies graviore quam Macedonum atque Alexandri avertit avertetque, modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae. (9.19.15–17).

Never have we had difficulties from enemy cavalry, never from infantry, never in open battle, never on even terrain, certainly never on our own ground: a soldier weighed down by arms may fear †a horseman†, arrows, blocked passes, places inaccessible for supplies. He has averted and will avert a thousand more weighty battle-lines than those of the Macedonians and Alexander, provided that the love of this peace under which we live, and the concern for citizen harmony, be perpetual.

The *miles* of the penultimate sentence remains, it should be emphasized, the subject of 'avertit avertetque' (9.19.17). All he needs to operate successfully is the good behaviour of all citizens towards one another; this means 'us'.⁷² Without concord all bets are off, since corporate success depends upon unity among its individual exponents.⁷³

The digression, therefore, erodes and then redefines the distinction accorded to individuals. Although, unlike Sallust and Cato, Livy initially exploits great names from Rome's history, he consistently emphasizes the corporate nature of their activities, before abandoning individual names altogether in favour of abstract or collective singulars: the *nomen Romanum*, the *senatus*, and the *miles* (an *unus homo* in the collective singular). That this development, from plural (several named Roman commanders) to singular (the unnamed *miles*), trumps any traditional reverence for Alexander as *unus homo* is suggested by Livy's corresponding pluralization of Rome's hypothetical enemy from one named king to the unspecific *mille acies*; one representative *miles* can outdo *mille acies*.⁷⁴

It is, therefore, a serious misunderstanding to interpret the Alexander digression, as Santoro L'Hoir does, as traditional encomium of *unus homo*. Her reading is based partly upon a failure to pick up the ironic tone of 'cessisset videlicet' at 9.17.12–14 (which she takes literally to mean that Roman generals *would* have yielded to Alexander), and overlooks the digression's tendency to dismantle and devalue uniqueness in favour of composite strength. As 9.18.19 makes clear, a real *unus homo* is dangerous for his state not only because of the risk of tyrannical domination but also because of the unhealthy dependency of the state (which should, in Roman minds, be *perpetua*) upon one short-lived mortal:

immo etiam eo plus periculi subisset quod Macedones unum Alexandrum habuissent, multis casibus non solum obnoxium sed etiam offerentem se, Romani multi fuissent

⁷⁰ Both meanings of *aetas* ('lifetime' and 'era') may be felt here.

⁷¹ Excellence as both soldier and leader is a conventional recipe for a commander's success. See Woodman, *op. cit.* (n. 36), 198, 228.

⁷² Livy has already deplored contemporary neglect of the once flourishing citizen army at 7.25.7–9, a passage of which, as Stephen Oakley has pointed out to me, 9.19.2–4 is clearly reminiscent.

⁷³ That Livy's notion of *concordia*, though, is less idealizing than that of Sallust has already been demonstrated by the list of obstacles to consular achievement at 9.18.13–15.

⁷⁴ For the potential for etymological play on *mille* and *miles*, see R. Maltby, *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies* (1991), 384, s.v. *miles*.

Alexandro vel gloria vel rerum magnitudine pares, quorum suo quisque fato sine publico discrimine viveret morereturque. (9.18.19)

Or rather he would have incurred all the more danger because the Macedonians had one Alexander, not only subject to many hazards but even deliberately exposing himself to them; there would have been many Romans a match for Alexander in glory and in greatness of deeds, each of whom could live or die according to his own fate without public crisis.

Long term survival and growth must, in a healthy system, depend upon numbers, tradition, and (by implication) history, rather than on one irreplaceable individual.⁷⁵

Similarly, Breitenbach's earlier, more sophisticated, reading of the digression within the traditions of praise of monarchy should also now be re-evaluated.⁷⁶ His stimulating parallel between Livy's extraordinary list of the handicaps endured by Roman commanders and Isocrates' catalogue of democracy's disadvantages provides an important critical tool for the reader of Livy's digression, but he does not fully register the extent to which Livy, while indeed deploying traditional pro-kingship motifs, reaches a different (and anti-monarchical) conclusion. The only Isocratean disadvantage of oligarchies and democracies that Livy retains without adjustment is the potential evil of civil strife (9.19.17).⁷⁷ However, while Isocrates says that 'the state which more than any other abhors absolute rule meets with disaster when it sends out many generals, and with success when it wages war under a single leader' (*Nicocles* 3.24), Livy offers a contrasting view of Macedon's system at 9.18.18–19 ('eo plus periculi subisset quod Macedones unum Alexandrum habuissent'). Moreover, the Isocratean list of monarchy's advantages over a briskly rotational system of government (*Nicocles* 3.17–21), while superficially resembling Livy 9.18.13–16, is also based on very different assumptions. While Isocrates' annual rulers lack experience and insight, Livy's are, as Breitenbach acknowledges, miraculously high achievers *despite* constitutional difficulties ('quo sint mirabiliores', 9.18.13). While Isocrates' democrats fall short in performing their duties because they pass the buck to others, Livy's leaders efficiently compensate for their colleagues' failures. The stress in Livy, then, is on *overcoming* disadvantages, and the successful acquire greater lustre by doing so. Kings have none of these difficulties to contend with and are, therefore, less worthy of praise. Livy has, then, 'refuted' the major Greek exponent of monarchy and apologist for Alexander's father, thereby contributing neatly to the victory of Roman over Greek.

V. CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS

The reading I offer here has unavoidable consequences for our understanding of the digression's contemporary references. While the memory of Antony or of Crassus would certainly be available to a reader thinking about East–West conflict, or about the effects of oriental *luxuria* on the *mos maiorum*, we should not lose sight of the real subject of the *AUC*: Rome.

In good synkritic fashion, the digression provides, in the figure of Alexander, a potentially negative *exemplum* for Rome, the force of which is all the greater because of the suggestive parallels between them. Not only do they compete in *magnitudo*, but the

⁷⁵ The dangers of such a situation were pointed out by Cicero even in the context of eulogy of Caesar (*Pro Marc.* 7.22, 'nam quis est omnium tam ignarus rerum . . . qui non intellegat tua salute contineri suam et ex unius tua vita pendere omnium? . . . doleoque, cum res publica immortalis esse debeat, eam in unius mortalis anima consistere', 'for who is so ignorant of the whole situation . . . that he does not understand that his safety is contained in yours and that the lives of all depend on yours alone? . . . and I grieve that, when the state ought to be immortal, it takes its stand in the life of a single mortal'). Cf. Tac., *Ann.* 1.11.

⁷⁶ Breitenbach, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 150–1.

⁷⁷ Livy's awareness of the potential drawbacks of a free, non-monarchical system is revealed already at 2.1.4–7, but there, too, he states his belief that a strong, mature, unified community can overcome those drawbacks. Once again, *concordia* is the key (implicit in 2.1.5 'animos eorum consociasset' and explicit in 2.1.11 (on the influence of the Senate) 'id mirum quantum profuit ad concordiam civitatis iungendosque patribus plebis animos').

career of Alexander offers important 'warnings' about Rome's future after the zenith of virtuous achievement in the late fourth century. Just as Alexander was said to have lost moral strength under the burdens of oriental luxury, so Rome — however late in her history (*Praef.* 11) — began to labour under the wealth and hedonistic habits acquired in Asia.⁷⁸ The very *magnitudo* she attained became unsustainable ('ut iam magnitudine laboret sua', *Praef.* 4) and the foundation of her success — that *disciplina* of 9.17.10 — began to slip, 'until it came to these times when we can endure neither our disorders nor their remedies' ('donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est', *Praef.* 9). Further, Alexander cloaked himself in a new *ingenium* under pressure from success and luxurious enticements (9.18.2), while Rome's greatest failures were ascribed to a loss of Romanness (made explicit at 5.38.5). Finally, the *ira* attributed to Alexander was also ingrained not only in Papirius himself, but also in the Roman army, as their behaviour in the Revenge Expedition (and even before Caudium) demonstrated.⁷⁹

Livy reinforces the synkrisis between the Roman people and Alexander in the ironic 'Isocratean' passage at 9.18.16 ('at hercule reges non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus sed domini rerum temporumque trahunt consiliis cuncta, non sequuntur', 'but, of course, kings are not only free from all impediments but, as masters of events and times, by their plans they drag all things with them, they do not follow along behind them').⁸⁰ On the one hand, royal deeds are diminished by their ease of accomplishment, as kings control *res* and *tempora* in any given situation; on the other, kings cannot match Rome's laborious (and therefore virtuous), but guaranteed, success. Therefore *tempora* is deliberately restricted in 9.18.16 to signify (in the limited sense of the Greek *καιρός*) only the time constraints upon individuals, and means little more than 'occasions' or 'opportunities'. A similar restriction may be operating upon *res* — 'event' or 'action' (i.e. only *res gestae*) as opposed to the total picture of Roman rule (*res gestae*, *res publica* and every other sort of *res*).

However, the particularly striking phrase here is 'domini rerum' (9.18.16); this is a rare collocation,⁸¹ and the parallel with Vergil, *Aen.* 1.282 ('Romanos, rerum dominos', 'Romans, masters of events') is suggestive. Dating Book 9 early would preclude allusion here, but the relatively high level of awareness of the *Aeneid* even long before its publication suggests that Livy could have heard, or known of, parts of the epic even in the mid-20s.⁸² If the digression may be dated to *c.* 25/24 B.C. and an argument for allusion may stand, then Livy's ironic transference of *domini* from the Roman people to external kings underlines the restrictions on the latter's temporal and material powers. Moreover, as the Vergilian line was said to have been approvingly quoted by Augustus,⁸³ the implications of such allusion would be complex and challenging. Whereas, in Vergil, Jupiter's prophecy which celebrates the power of the Roman people culminates in celebration of the *domus Caesaris*, Livy, by contrast, in celebrating the Roman people, pointedly downplays the importance of kingly individuals. The function of the Vergilian allusion would then be subtly admonitory of Augustus.

Even without such allusion, however, Livy's demolition of solitary heroic greatness inevitably brings us back to an old chestnut in academic debate, namely the position of

⁷⁸ 39.6.7. Moreover, Livy's greatest predecessor had fulminated against Rome's inability to manage *secundae res* (*Jug.* 41.3, cf. *Cat.* 11.7).

⁷⁹ 9.1.7 'tuarum irarum'; 9.13.4 'ira militaris'; 9.14.13 'dulcedinem irae'.

⁸⁰ The irony of this contrast is pointed by the interjection 'hercule'.

⁸¹ *TLL* V, 1 1922:34–43.

⁸² Some time before 25 B.C. Propertius (2.34.61–2) explicitly alludes to Vergil's treatment of Actium (*Aen.* 8.675–713) as well as to the opening of the *Aeneid* (Propertius 2.34.63–4). On the dating of the *AUC*, see n. 85 below.

⁸³ Suetonius, *Div. Aug.* 40.5, 'en dominos rerum

gentemque togatam'. This in itself is not enough to support the case, given that we have no way of knowing when Augustus quoted the line. Nevertheless, that the *Aeneid* passage may lie behind 9.18.16 is also suggested by a further echo of *Aen.* 1.278 ('his ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono'). On Vergil as regularly more 'Augustan' than Livy, see A. J. Woodman, 'Virgil the historian: *Aeneid* 8.626–62 and Livy', in J. Diggle, J. B. Hall, and H. D. Jocelyn (eds), *Studies in Latin Literature and its Tradition in Honour of C. O. Brink* (1989), 132–45, although Woodman takes the view that in Book 8, at least, Vergil is responding to Livy.

the historian *vis-à-vis* the princeps.⁸⁴ The sometimes reductive nature of the debate about Livy and Augustus is unfortunate, but uneasily settling for a vague commonality of viewpoint between a (nevertheless) independent-minded historian and the princeps is not really satisfactory either, and it is worth spelling out the implications of the Alexander digression.

Both Moles and Woodman have re-opened the 'Augustus question' in studies of the Preface, particularly of *Praef.* 9 ('haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus'). Woodman argues for composition before Actium and, consequently, that we cannot draw any conclusions at all from the Preface concerning Livy's relations with, or expectations of, Augustus after he became princeps, but he does read 'remedia pati' as a coded reference to one-man rule (an unpleasant, but necessary, medicine for present troubles). Moles, who dates the Preface to 28/27 B.C., accepts Woodman's reading of *remedia*, but sees also an allusion to the salutary effects of historiography itself. On the latter's (more conventional) dating, the composition of the Alexander digression must be placed in the late 20s; the implications of that were first seen by Luce: 'the later the passage is dated, the more peculiar the passionate vehemence becomes: unflattering to the government and to the emperor, impolitic for the writer.'⁸⁵

It does indeed seem difficult to make Augustus' new regime seem anything but alien and un-Roman in the light of 9.17–19, not necessarily because it brought a period of one-man rule, but because that rule looked set to last, albeit cloaked in republican institutions. The digression is not, as Breitenbach would have it, praise of monarchy, but rather a eulogizing survey of republican tradition, in which no one man is ever indispensable, or even alone in his pre-eminence.⁸⁶ Dependence upon one irreplaceable individual increases dangers for the state ('he would have incurred the more danger because the Macedonians had one Alexander', 9.18.18–19), and while Sallust thought that the existence of only two outstanding individuals threatened the health of the *res publica*, for Livy the reduction to one risks the end of the virtuous species altogether. Under these circumstances, *imitatio Alexandri* is both sharply devalued ('multi pares', 9.18.19) and ideologically suspect. By the time the Alexander digression was written, on either dating, internecine strife is over ('this peace under which we live', 9.19.17). Early or late in the 20s, therefore, the digression does not support *permanent* one-man rule, but corrects Sallustian pessimism to posit a resurgence of healthy *metus hostilis* ('mille acies graviores . . . avertit avertetque', 'he has averted and will avert a thousand more weighty armies', 9.19.17), in which the Roman *miles* can flourish, *disciplina* can be restored, and, presumably, virtuous men can grow numerous once again. The unusual synchronic 'pageant of Roman heroes' — drawn from a period which Livy himself designates as the most admirable in Roman history — offered in support of his arguments is, therefore, radically different in philosophy and purpose from either Book VI of the *Aeneid* or the Augustan Forum, both of which offered primarily diachronic reminders of past heroism.⁸⁷

Given all this, it is not enough to say, with Isager, that 'Livy presents the moralistic approach to Alexander without being in conflict with any established Augustan image of Alexander'.⁸⁸ Augustus' *imitatio Alexandri* in the very years during which Book 9 was

⁸⁴ R. Syme, 'Livy and Augustus', *HSCP* 64 (1959), 27–87; H. J. Mette, 'Livius und Augustus', *Gymnasium* 68 (1961), 269ff.; H. Petersen, 'Livy and Augustus', *TAPA* 92 (1961), 440–52; P. G. Walsh, 'Livy and Augustus', *PACA* 4 (1961), 26–37; E. Badian, 'Livy and Augustus', in W. Schuller (ed.), *Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes* (1993), 9–38; K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture* (1996), 280–7; Kraus and Woodman, *op. cit.* (n. 48), 70–4.

⁸⁵ Woodman, *op. cit.* (n. 26), 134–5; Moles, *op. cit.* (n. 28), 153; Luce, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 231. I am unconvinced by P. Burton, 'The last republican historian: a new date for the composition of Livy's first pentad', *Historia* 49 (2000), 429–46, who argues for a start date of 33 B.C. for Book 1.

⁸⁶ 9.18.19, 'there would have been many Romans to

match Alexander . . . , each of whom could live or die according to his own fate without public crisis'. The expendability of Livy's great *exempla* is revealed, in some cases, in the very acts which make them great; in the case of the Decii, for example, their deaths actually revitalize the Roman battle effort, which is then perfectly co-ordinated by their surviving colleagues.

⁸⁷ On the 'mismatch' between the content of the *AUC* and the *elogia* of the Forum Augustum, see T. J. Luce, 'Livy, Augustus and the Forum Augustum', in K. A. Raafaub and M. Toher (eds), *Between Republic and Empire. Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate* (1990), 123–38.

⁸⁸ Isager, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 83.

composed and published is well-documented⁸⁹ and its anti-Parthian message is clear. However, Livy's line in the digression is tougher than Isager suggests, and he puts moralistic reflections on Alexander's vices at the service of his arguments against *unus homo*. The digression is, if not crudely anti-Augustan, at least a manifestation of the qualities that made Livy a *Pompeianus*, a believer in the state which has room for a *unus homo* at regular intervals, and which functions at its best when great men are plentiful and fails to degenerate from Republic to Empire precisely because of that series of *unus homo* figures.

VI. CONCLUSION

In itself, then, the digression can already be seen as the surviving representative of Roman counterfactual traditions which are now mostly lost to us. The old view, however, of the passage as a party piece divorced from its context (as either a genuine irrelevance or a chauvinistic distraction from the distress of Caudium) must now be revised, and its links with the remainder of Livy's work called into play to assess its contribution to the author's historiographical project.

First, it is inaccurate to read the digression as an intrusion of irrational chauvinism into an otherwise clear-mindedly historical narrative. It is simply an evasion of the problem to posit an apologetic agenda for Livy at 9.17–19, and by trivializing or even largely ignoring the content of the digression (which, although naturally eulogizing of Rome, includes far more than the 'look how well we did despite Caudium' motif) to dismiss it as a patriotic fanfare.⁹⁰ Digressions do not merely offer quarantine through which infected narrative passes on its way to convalescence, and, in any case, there is already an effective 'barrier' between the disgrace and the rest of Book 9 in the full peripeteia and rehabilitation achieved by the Revenge Expedition. Rome wins all 'replays' of Caudium and the narrative remains relentlessly positive, so there seems little need for the digression to have 'mitigated' the defeat.⁹¹ To extend the medical metaphor, by 9.16 the Roman narrative is once more robust and needs no quarantine; it is Samnite history which is ailing. Moreover, 9.19.9, the crucial sentence for the 'apologetic' or 'chauvinistic' schools, hardly adopts a 'minimizing' strategy in juxtaposing the shameful but virtually bloodless disaster at Caudium to the gory devastation of Cannae — more a 'maximizing' strategy.

The apologetic reading also fails to take into account the degree to which Livy writes his digression against the historiographical grain, disturbing the expected synkritic programme (which would surely have been purely eulogistic) in order to continue his analysis of the central issues of the Caudine disaster: the nature of leadership, the character of the Roman *miles*, the importance of *consilium*, and the way in which all three interact to increase the *magnitudo* of the Roman state. Even the digression's 'chauvinistic' pride in Rome's resilience in adversity is hardly new in the text, but echoes the judgements of the two foreign 'wise advisers', Herennius and Aulus Calavius, in the Caudine episode, both of whom emphasize Roman reluctance to accept defeat.⁹²

Finally, traditional readings have underestimated the value of a counterfactual digression as a tool for historical thinking. Livy has so contextualized the digression that it prompts engagement in the kinds of historical reflections provoked by the Preface, the

⁸⁹ Pliny, *NH* 37.10. Cf. Suet., *Aug.* 50; Cass. Dio 51.3.5–7. See Weippert, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 214–23; Gruen, *op. cit.* (n. 18), 68.

⁹⁰ Lipovsky, for example, shows no interest at all in the content of the digression.

⁹¹ See (e.g.): the emphasis on Roman *disciplina* and the re-establishment of Roman control, 9.20.10; Fabius' expedition through the Ciminian wood, 9.38.4–6; unsuccessful Samnite ambush, 9.31.6–16; electoral synchronism with both Sack and Forks

avoided by Papirius as dictator, 9.38.15–39.1; Samnites sent under the yoke by Fabius at Allifae, 9.42.6–7. Cf. Burck, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 326, on the significance of 42.7 in relation to the disaster at the beginning of the book.

⁹² 'ea est Romana gens, quae victa quiescere nesciat', 9.3.12; 'aut Romana se ignorare ingenia aut silentium illud Samnitibus febiles brevi clamores gemitusque excitaturum', 9.7.4.

running 'debate' with Sallust, key passages of Books 7–9, and the preceding narrative of Book 9 itself. The counterfactual mode and the first-person singular give way by the end of the digression to first person plural exhortation and contemporary 'reality'; the road metaphor in the Caudine narrative, which applies alike to the main narrative path of history, to the 'digression', and to the activities of historian, reader and historical agents⁹³ serves to introduce the digression seamlessly, but also narrows the gap between the historical and the hypothetical, and the accelerated pace with which 'real' history is surveyed in this 'unreal' context serves to accentuate the primary lessons of the *AUC*. Livy has adopted the hypothetical mode to show how to read history and how to evaluate contemporary history, and the conclusion to which he leads us is that even the most hypothetical contrasts between republic and monarchy illuminate 'our' own day. The digression, then, has universal, generalizing power as a didactic instrument, instructing readers in the proper understanding both of the *remedia* of the Preface and the accumulated thematic structures of the second pentad on which it depends so heavily.

In conclusion, any consideration of the hypothetical in historiography needs to consider Aristotle, *Poetics* 9, which has often been adduced as a useful and challenging text for the understanding of ancient historiography, particularly, in recent years, of Thucydides, but also of ancient counterfactual history in general.⁹⁴ Here Aristotle analyses the differences between generalizing fiction and specific history:

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα διαφέρουσιν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων). ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

It is clear from what we have already said that the function of the poet is not to say what *has* happened, but to say the kind of thing that *would* happen, i.e. what is possible in accordance with probability or necessity. The historian and the poet are not distinguished by their use of verse or prose; it would be possible to turn the works of Herodotus into verse, and it would be a history in verse just as much as in prose. The distinction is this: the one says what has happened, the other the kind of thing that would happen. For this reason poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history. Poetry tends to express universals, and history particulars. (Aristotle, *Poetics* 9, trans. Heath)

If Aristotle's criticisms of historiography are unfair, they at least pinpoint a problem inherent in the recording of *res gestae* which are simultaneously totally of their time, and also sources of widely applicable *exempla* for future generations. A digression like Livy's may indeed lose something in historical precision, but its gains are nevertheless very substantial, as it is poised between contemplation of the past and extrapolation from the past of lessons for the present and the future. That past is formally hypothetical, but even a counterfactual past enacts events which might have happened, and which have real historical analogies: Alexander might have invaded Italy as his uncle did, or as Pyrrhus and Hannibal were to do, and as Rome's future enemies will do. Moreover, Alexander's status as *unus homo* is *not* counterfactual and raises serious questions about the possibly analogous status of Rome's new Alexander. Counterfactual history of this kind, then, does not spring from trivialities like Cleopatra's nose, but expresses

⁹³ Notions of 'turning', 'turning away', or 'turning aside' in the digression are common to Livy ('declinarem', 9.17.1), the reader ('deverticula', 9.17.1), and Alexander himself ('in Europam vertisset', 9.16.19); even the name of Alexander, the 'man-avertter', eloquent in this context, is trumped by the name of Rome, which outlasts turning fortune ('vertenti fortunae', 9.17.7), and finally defeated by that of the

anonymous *miles* who has always 'turned away' foreign invaders and will continue to do so ('avertit avertetque', 9.19.17).

⁹⁴ J. L. Moles, 'Truth and untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides', in C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman (eds), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (1993), 88–121; Suerbaum, op. cit. (n. 7), 38–9.

universals that, while initially pleasurable to contemplate in Book 9, have direct and uncomfortable implications for contemporary events.

University of Manchester

maria-ruth.morello@man.ac.uk